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What is bioethics?
Bioethics is a branch of applied eth-
ics and it covers a very vide area of dif-
ferent problems. More specifically, bio-
ethics deals with general problems like 
abortion, euthanasia, death, as well as 
with the more specific problems like 
cloning, moral and cognitive enhance-
ment, and the moral status of stem cells. 
Still, despite the fact that some of these 
questions have been discussed and ex-
amined even in ancient times (e.g. abor-
tion and euthanasia), the development 
of bioethics as a philosophical disci-
pline was relatively recent. Namely, both 
Nazi experimentation non humans dur-
ing World War II and the technologi-
cal breakthrough (e.g. the improvement 
of the life-sustaining technologies and 
the technologies for prenatal screening)
have posed many questions that could 
not be ignored and pushed aside. More-
over, the seriousness of these questions 
entailed a widely accepted attitude that 
the answers to them were not merely an 
option, but also a necessity. 
Still, even though bioethical questions 
are among the oldest and, perhaps, the 
most important questions in philoso-
phy, how many people are able to give a 
categorical, unambiguous, and clear an-
swer to them? Most probably, a person 
who could give such an answer would 
exhibit that she didn’t give them a se-
rious thought. Bioethical issues are ex-
tremely complex mostly because of the 
very complicated net of logical and ethi-
cal implications that these issues typi-
cally have. Also, this complexity of bio-
ethical issues is the main reason why 
bioethics is an interdisciplinary field. 
Voin Milevski
Institute of Philosophy  
Faculty of Philosophy,  
University of Belgrade
BIOETHICS
(VojinRakić, Ivan Mladenović, 
RadaDrezgić (eds.), Bioetika,  
JP SlužbeniGlasnik, 2012)
BIOETHICSVoIn MIlEVSKI
272
This is exactly what makes bioethics in-
teresting and worth studying, even for 
a person who never took a class in bio-
ethics, or, as a matter of fact, who never 
took a class in any of the scientific fields 
that are concerned with bioethical ques-
tions. Therefore, the fact that we final-
ly have a very comprehensive anthology 
of bioethical papers in Serbian language 
can be enormously beneficial for many 
people; including both professional eth-
icists and the reading public in the wid-
est sense.
The main advantages  
of this anthology
The first remarkable and noticeable 
thing about this anthology is the names 
of the authors whose papers are col-
lected and published in it. More spe-
cifically, in this anthology are collected 
papers of the greatest experts on bio-
ethical issues. I will mention just the 
few of them: James Rachels, Judith Jar-
vis Thomson, Mary Ann Warren, Don 
Marquis, Peter Singer, Gregory Pence, 
John Harris, Julian Savulescu, Ingmar 
Persson, and many others. Evidently, 
to the reader who was not previous-
ly familiarized with bioethics, these 
names may appear to be quite ordinary 
and uninteresting. However, the phi-
losophers who were mentioned above 
are the most famous and respected ex-
perts dealing with the bioethical prob-
lems. Also, it should be noted, some of 
the papers published in this antholo-
gy are classics. It is practically impos-
sible be a competent bioethicist, or, as 
a matter of fact, a competent philoso-
pher, and not to have at least some ba-
sic knowledge about papers written by 
Rachels, Thomson, Savulescu or Sing-
er. Because of that, it is almost incon-
ceivable to find an anthology of bio-
ethical papers which does not include 
at least some of these articles. All this 
directly demonstrates and proves the 
highest quality of this anthology. 
The structure of this anthology
This anthology covers almost all major 
problems of bioethics. More precisely, 
articles in this anthology have been di-
vided in six groups, depending on the 
topic. Therefore, there are six main top-
ics: abortion, prenatal diagnostics, mor-
al and cognitive enhancement of the 
people, cloning and the moral status of 
stem cells, rare diseases and genetic dis-
orders, and the sixth part is concerned 
with the problems of death, palliative 
care, and euthanasia. All these issues are 
explained and analyzed in an exhaustive 
manner. Therefore, it is quite possible to 
say that the person interested in bioeth-
ics can find in this anthology an answer 
to almost every bioethical question.
The anthology is divided in six parts. 
Since there is not enough space to give 
a detailed review of all the papers col-
lected in the anthology, I will give a brief 
exposition and interpretation of just the 
few of them. In the first group there are 
five articles which deal with abortion. It 
is interesting to note that practically all 
of them have become classics in the bio-
ethical literature. However, article “In 
Defense of Abortion” written by Judith 
Jarvis Thomson’s is definitely the most 
interesting one in this part of the anthol-
ogy.1 The most interesting  characteristic 
1  Bioetika 2012: 25–42.
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of this article is Thomson’s surprising-
ly vivid imagination andquite original 
thought experiments with which she at-
tempts to prove her essential claim that 
a woman has the right to her body. Of 
course, in order for a reader to fully un-
derstand Thomson’s example, it needs 
to be explained what the central argu-
ment against abortion consists in. In a 
somewhat simplified form, this argu-
ment goes like this:
1) It is wrong to kill an innocent 
human being.
2) A human fetus is an innocent 
human being.
3) Therefore, it is wrong to kill a 
human fetus.
Since the premises and the conclusion 
in the given argument are quite under-
standable, they will need no further ex-
planation. The usual liberal response is 
to deny the second premise of this ar-
gument. So, the main issue in the de-
bate focuses on the question whether 
the fetus is a human being. Most oppo-
sition to abortion relies on the premise 
that the fetus is a human being, or, more 
specifically a person, from the moment 
of conception. According to Thom-
son, however, this premise is false and 
the fetus is not a person from the mo-
ment of conception (although she also 
believes that the fetus becomes a person 
well before birth). Still, for J. J. Thom-
son the most challenging thing to do is 
to ask what happens if, for the sake of ar-
gument, we allow that the first premise 
is true; i.e. what happens if we grant that 
the fetus is a person from the moment of 
conception. Her thought examples and 
the whole elaboration of this problem 
are ingenious.
J. J. Thomson concludes her paper with 
the claim that while abortion is not im-
permissible, it is not always permissible. 
According to her, it would be quite inde-
cent in the woman to request an abor-
tion, and indecent in a doctor to per-
form it, if she is in her seventh month, 
and wants the abortion just to avoid the 
nuisance of postponing a trip abroad.2 
On the other hand, as Thomson claims, 
a sick and desperately frightened four-
teen-year-old schoolgirl, pregnant due 
to rape, may choose abortion, and in 
this case it would be quite permissible.
The second group of articles is based on 
the so-called case studies and it deals 
with the prenatal diagnostics. Concern-
ing this group of papers, I will make a 
brief comment on Rayna Rapp’s arti-
cle “Refusing Prenatal Diagnosis: The 
Meanings of Bioscience in a Multicul-
tural World”.3 This article presents an 
anthropological analysis of prenatal di-
agnosis. Generally speaking, prenatal di-
agnosis is a cluster of technologies used 
for assessing the chromosomal and ge-
netic normality of fetuses in utero. The 
list of these technologies includes ultra-
sound imaging, amniocentesis, and oth-
er evolving experimental interventions, 
all backed up by abortion technology, 
for those who receive bad news about 
the health of their fetuses and choose to 
end specific pregnancies. In her article, 
Rayna Rapp explores the reasons wom-
en of diverse class, racial ethnic, nation-
al, and religious backgrounds give for 
their decisions not to accept an amnio-
centesis or, having accepted one, not to 
2  Ibid. 41.
3 Ibid. 125–153.
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pursue an abortion after diagnosis of se-
rious fetal disability.4
Most refusals happen during or direct-
ly after a counseling session. According 
to Rapp, the most common reason that 
women from many social sectors and 
cultural traditions gave for refusing am-
niocentesis was fear of miscarriage.5For 
these women, any risk of causing the 
loss of the pregnancy, no matter how 
small, was totally unacceptable. How-
ever, Rapp underlines that in some 
cases women accept an amniocentesis 
and, learning of “bad” or “positive” re-
sults, decide to continue their pregnan-
cies. Still, this can easily be explained. 
Because amniocentesis is convention-
ally offered between the sixteenth and 
twentieth week of gestation, it comes 
at a time in which a commitment to a 
pregnancy has already been made. Also, 
some people express a disbelief in the 
accuracy of testing. Generally speak-
ing, those without scientific education 
are most likely to reject testing altogeth-
er, although this is not always the case. 
Religious beliefs provide another set of 
powerful resources from which a refus-
al may be drawn. The general conclu-
sion of this article is that women with 
strong religious affiliations, strong kin-
ship or other communitarian social sup-
port, or powerful reasons anchored in 
their reproductive histories are most 
likely to decide against the biomedical 
information amniocentesis brings as a 
basis for accepting or rejecting a partic-
ular pregnancy.6
4 Ibid. 125.
5 Ibid. 136.
6 Ibid. 150.
The third part of the anthology deals 
with a very hot issue in the many recent 
bioethical debates; namely, with the is-
sue about the moral and cognitive en-
hancement. More specifically, papers in 
this part analyze the possibility of en-
hancing both the physical and the men-
tal capacities of the people byn on tradi-
tional, nonconventional, genetic means. 
The special emphasis should be given 
to the paper written by Julian Savules-
cu and Ingmar Persson “The Perils of 
Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent 
Imperative to Enhance the Moral Char-
acter of Humanity”7, as well asto the pa-
per by John Harris “Moral Enhancement 
and Freedom”.8
The fourth part of the anthology deals 
with the issue of cloning and the mor-
al status of stem cells. First, I would 
like to single out the paper by Grego-
ry Pens “Cloning”.9 Pens starts his pa-
per by stressing an interesting fact that 
over the past decade journalists wrote 
more stories about cloning than about 
any other bioethical issue. According to 
him, movies such as Jurassic Park and 
The Island of Dr. Moreau are clear exam-
ples of this fact. Also, Pens explains that 
the word “clone” derives from the Greek 
word “klone” or “twig,” referring to the 
horticultural process whereby a new 
plant is created asexually by planting 
a twig in nutrient-filled water.10 How-
ever, in modern science, “cloning” re-
fers to reproduction of the genetic ma-
terial of an ancestor-organism without 
7 Ibid. 283–305.
8 Ibid. 307–328.
9 Ibid. 359–372.
10 Ibid. 360.
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sex. Interestingly, in common think-
ing, “clone” typically denotes something 
subhuman; something similar to a ro-
bot, or a zombie; something less valu-
able than humans and, apparently, more 
dangerous. Given this common attitude 
toward cloning, Pens attempts to prove 
two main points. The first one is that a 
person originated by cloning from genes 
of an ancestor will not be an exact copy 
of that ancestor. Actually, he will differ 
more from his ancestor than identical 
twins differ. Twins share the same egg, 
mitochondrial DNA and historical era, 
and (usually) the same parents and cul-
ture.11 By contrast, a person originated 
by cloning doesn’t share these similari-
ties with his ancestor. A second point of 
this paper is that a being created from 
the human genes of a human ancestor, 
gestated by a human mother and raised 
in a human family, would be a per-
son, not a zombie or subhuman. Still, 
it needs to be emphasized, this doesn’t 
necessarily mean that a clone cannot 
and will not be dangerous. 
Cloning humans is also widely believed 
to be unnatural, and therefore wrong. 
While the premise according to which 
cloning is unnatural is certainly true, 
there is a suppressed premise that ev-
erything unnatural is wrong. Howev-
er, as Pens notes, this premise is utter-
ly false.
Also, there are important questions re-
garding the moral status of stem cells. 
Namely, what moral status should we at-
tribute to stem cells? That is the main 
question that Peter Singer and Agata 
Sygen attempt to answer in their paper 
11 Ibid. 361.
“Moral status of the stem cells”.12 To an-
swer this question, they thoroughly ana-
lyze the properties of embryos and other 
entities that could develop into beings 
that have moral status; namely, adult 
humans. The analysis given in this pa-
per indicates that those who grant mor-
al status to embryos should also grant it 
to stem cells. Authors conclude that the 
more plausible position is to deny moral 
status to embryos, and thus to stem cells 
as well.13
The fifth part of the anthology deals with 
the issues connected to the rare diseas-
es and genetic disorders, and the sixth 
part is concerned with the problems of 
death, palliative care, and euthanasia. 
Regarding this part of the anthology, I 
would like to single out the famous pa-
per written by James Rachels “Active and 
Passive Euthanasia”.14 Rachels starts his 
paper with the claim that the distinction 
between active and passive euthanasia is 
crucial for medical ethics and that it is 
widely accepted by most doctors. The 
general idea behind this doctrine (i.e. 
the doctrine according to which there 
should be a clear distinction between 
active and passive euthanasia) is that it 
is permissible, at least in some cases, to 
withhold treatment and allow a patient 
to die, but that, on the other hand, it is 
never permissible to take any direct ac-
tion designed to kill the patient. Essen-
tially, Rachels’ paper is designed to show 
that the distinction between active and 
passive euthanasia is defective, and that 
a strong case can be made against it. 
The first thing that is apparently wrong 
12 Ibid. 419–442.
13 Ibid. 437.
14 Ibid. 583–589.
BIOETHICSVoIn MIlEVSKI
276
with the doctrine which is grounded on 
this distinction is its obvious cruelty. As 
Rachels says, the doctrine which says 
that a baby may be allowed to dehydrate 
and wither, but may not be given an in-
jection that would end its life without 
suffering, seems so patently cruel as to 
require no further refutation.15 
But, there are other important  reasons 
why people accept the distinction be-
tween active and passive  euthanasia. 
Typ ically, people think that killing 
someone is morally worse than letting 
someone die. But, according to Rachels, 
killing, in itself, is not worse than letting 
die. The bare difference between killing 
and letting die does not, in itself, make 
a moral difference. Rachels wants to de-
rive a clear conclude from this that ac-
tive euthanasia is not worse than passive 
euthanasia. If a doctor lets a patient die, 
for humane reasons, he is in the same 
moral position as if he had given the 
patient a lethal injection for humane 
reasons.16
The importance  
of this anthology 
Almost needless to say, bioethical prob-
lems and questions does not leave the 
reading public emotionally unmoved 
and indifferent. The clearest example 
that provides evidence for this claim is 
the paper: “After-birth abortion: why 
should the baby live?” From the first 
moment, this article aroused the im-
mense dissatisfaction among people 
around the world. Interestingly, in this 
paper there is nothing essentially new. 
15 Ibid. 585.
16 Ibid. 588.
In fact, some of the ideas in this paper 
are very old. More specifically, the main 
idea could be found in Michael Tooley’s 
paper “Abortion and Infanticide”, which 
was published in 1972. However, since 
the reading public was unaware of the 
claims that Tooley defended forty years 
ago, it seemed that the idea of moral 
justification of infanticide was outra-
geous and grossly offensive to decency 
or morality. More importantly, the read-
ing public was totally unfamiliar with 
the fact that philosophers analyze ques-
tions quite openly and with no preju-
dices, even if these questions might 
to a great extent appear to be immoral 
and displeasing. It is my personal belief 
that this anthology could enable people 
in Serbia to gain more knowledge both 
about bioethical problems and, what 
is even more important, about contro-
versial philosophical solutions of these 
problems. This is probably the most im-
portant feature of this anthology.
Of course, when it comes to the anthol-
ogy of philosophical articles, it is some-
times almost impossible for a reader to 
understand the detailed and compli-
cated argumentation without thorough 
philosophical education. The most diffi-
cult and discouraging part in becoming 
proficient in any science is its terminol-
ogy. Philosophy is no exception. More 
importantly, bioethics, as was men-
tioned above, deals with the problems 
that are extremely interesting even to 
those people who are not philosophers 
and who do not have any kind of pre-
vious personal knowledge about philo-
sophical terminology. Surprisingly and 
fortunately, it seems that bioethics is 
the branch of philosophy that is most 
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suitable for such a reader. It does not in-
clude too complicated terminology, and 
the argumentation is not too complex 
and difficult to follow. The main rea-
son for this is most probably that bio-
ethics is an interdisciplinary study and, 
as a consequence of that, the bioethical 
argumentation has to be formulated in 
such a manner that it could be under-
stood even by people with little or no 
philosophical education. To conclude, 
all this means that this anthology will be 
a very useful supplement in the private 
libraries of many people who want to 
learn more about bioethical problems. 
Finally, it will also be an indispensable 
help for many Serbian students working 
on bioethical problems. 
